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This paper analyses the choices of exchange rate regimes in developing countries since 1980. 
Static and dynamic random-effects multinomial panel models are estimated using simulation-
based  techniques.  Explanatory  variables  include  OCA  fundamentals,  stabilization 
considerations, currency crises factors, and  political and institutional  features. The results 
reveal strong state dependence in regime choices. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  choice  of  exchange  rate  regimes  has  long  been  a  controversial  topic  among 
academic  economists  and  policy  makers.  For  most  developing  countries,  it  is  commonly 
regarded  as  their  single  most  important  macroeconomic  policy  decision,  which  strongly 
influences the making and efficacy of other macroeconomic policies and is a centrepiece of 
macroeconomic policy prescriptions given by institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. The collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1973 provided 
many countries with a far wider range of choices than before. While a few leading currencies 
in the industrial world moved toward freely floating exchange rate regimes, most countries 
continued to apply some kind of exchange rate pegs. Since the mid-1980s a trend toward 
more flexible regimes emerged, and the share of pegged regimes has declined. However, 
independently floating exchange rates comparable to those of major international currencies 
remain rare in the developing world. Instead, various types of intermediate arrangements were 
adopted to combine exchange rate stability with policy flexibility. 
The variation in exchange rate regimes invoked research interests to the determination 
of these choices. Theoretical investigation on the topic can be traced back to the Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) theory of the 1960s, where the exchange rate is primarily viewed as an 
expenditure-switching device for aggregate demand management in general and for balance-
of-payments adjustment in particular. This literature develops a list of criteria for favouring 
fixed-rate  regimes  against  flexible-rate  regimes,  including  high  factor  mobility  (Mundell, 
1961),  small  economic  size  and  high  economic  openness  (McKinnon,  1963),  and  high 
production diversity (Kenen, 1969), since exchange rate adjustment is unnecessary or unable 
to switch expenditures if these criteria are fulfilled. The literature of the 1970s focused on the 
automatic-stabilizer  property  of  exchange  rates  in  response  of  nominal  and  real  shocks   3 
(Boyer, 1978; McKinnon, 1981). The main conclusion is that, in terms of output stabilization, 
fixed-rate regimes perform better if domestic nominal shocks dominate, while flexible-rate 
regimes are preferable if real shocks are the main source of disturbances. Since both types of 
shocks tend to coexist and may vary in relative importance, various types of managed floating 
regimes  are  recommended.  Following  the  analysis  of  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983)  on  the 
credibility of monetary policy, the literature in the 1980s discusses the possibility of using 
exchange rates as nominal anchor. Many authors advocate fixing the exchange rate against a 
low-inflation  foreign  currency  to  improve  the  anti-inflation  credibility  of  the  domestic 
monetary authority (Goldstein, 1980; Melitz, 1988; Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992). 
Empirical research on exchange regime choices started in the late 1970s, when more 
diverse regime choices began to be observed. The early studies selected potential regime 
determinants based mainly on the OCA criteria (Heller, 1978; Dreyer, 1978), and those in the 
1980s added variables to reflect types of shocks and stabilization strategies (Melvin, 1985; 
Savvides, 1990). Some authors also include institutional and political variables as potential 
regime determinants (Edwards, 1996; Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; Méon and Rizzo, 2002). 
A comprehensive approach covering a wide range of regime determinants is adopted by many 
recent studies (Rizzo, 1998; Poirson, 2001; Juhn and Mauro, 2002; von Hagen and Zhou, 
2002a).  As summarized in Table 1 for a sample of selected papers, the empirical results seem 
to be sensitive to the sample composition, data construction, and model specification.
1  
                                                
1 Many papers use various model specifications to analyse the choices of exchange rate regimes, for which Table 
1 either reports the main results, which tend to be robust across specifications, or indicates the changing signs of 
the coefficients. Some papers use explanatory variables not very common in other studies, which are not 
included in the list of variables here. It should also be noted that some variables, especially real and nominal 
shocks, have different proxies in different studies. To ease comparisons across studies, Table 1 reports the 
qualitative impact of each variable on the probability of adopting a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime.   4 
It is clear from Table 1 that many studies (ten out of fourteen under our review, denoted 
by “B” for regimes) use a simple binary structure to classify exchange rate regimes into either 
fixed or flexible ones, although the theoretical literature on optimal stabilization suggests that 
intermediate regimes between the two corner solutions are preferred in the presence of both 
real and nominal shocks. Seven studies include intermediate regimes as a separate option and 
use an ordered-choice classification (denoted by “O” for regimes), with the assumption that 
the degree of regime flexibility is monotone in the regime determinants. Only two studies use 
a multinomial choice structure (denoted by “M” for regimes), which is a general and flexible 
framework able to capture both the diversity in regime choices and the complexity in the 
response of regime choices to the changes in the determinants.  
        [ Table 1 is about here. ] 
The  main  estimation  methods  are  cross  section  and  pooled  panel  analysis.  In  cross 
section analysis, exchange rate regime choices of a given year are typically explained by the 
average values of the independent variables over  several previous  years.  Although it can 
dampen  the  effects  of  temporary  disturbances  in  the  regime  determinants  and  attenuate 
endogeneity problems of these variables, this is less appropriate when substantial volatility is 
observed in the economic environment or the exchange rate regime itself undergoes frequent 
changes. Using past averages to explain current choices in such a constellation may result in 
misleading  inferences  on  the  role  of  some  factors.  In  pooled  panel  analysis,  country 
heterogeneity in unobserved factors as well as temporal correlation in the regime choices by 
the  same  country  are  ignored.  This  simplification  overlooks  the  role  of  credibility  and 
reputation  for  the  desirability  and  sustainability  of  exchange  rate  pegs.  In  reality,  state 
dependence is likely to play an important role in the choice of exchange rate regimes, since 
past experiences with a certain regime can influence its desirability and the probability of its 
being continued. Such a dynamic linkage requires either including lagged regime choices as   5 
explanatory variables, or allowing for serial correlation in the error terms. However, due to 
technical  difficulties  in  the  estimation,  especially  the  heavy  computational  burden  of 
numerical  integrations,  panel  discrete-choice  models  are  rarely  implemented  for  the 
explanation of exchange rate regime choices. 
This paper aims at filling the blank by introducing a multinomial panel model for the 
analysis  of  exchange  rate  regime  choices.  We  study  regime  choices  in  more  than  100 
developing countries, emerging market economies, and transition economies during the 1980s 
and the 1990s. The model allows three choices-fixed, intermediate, and flexible regimes-in a 
non-ordered way and can be easily extended to choice structures with more alternatives. The 
dynamic linkage among regime choices is modelled by including country-specific random 
effects  to  capture  auto-correlation  as  well  as  lagged  regime  choices  to  account  for  state 
dependence.  The  technical  difficulty  involved  in  the  numerical  integrations  is  solved  by 
adopting a simulation-based estimator (the GHK simulator, see discussion below). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the classification of 
exchange rate regimes as well as the potential regime determinants. Section 3 presents our 
multinomial  panel  model  for  exchange  rate  regime  choices  and  sketch  the  estimation 
procedures. The estimation results are discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and Determinants 
 
2.1  The classification of exchange rate regimes 
The classification of exchange rate regimes is a controversial task. The exchange rate 
regimes adopted by developing countries cover a wide range of alternatives, some of which 
do not  fall  neatly into the conventional fixed-or-flexible dichotomy. While the difference   6 
between currency boards and freely floating regimes is obvious, that between adjustable pegs 
and managed floating regimes tends to be blurred, especially when the adjustment is frequent 
under the former or the management is tight under the latter. Therefore, whether a particular 
exchange regime should be classified as fixed or flexible is often debatable. To complicate the 
issue  further,  there  is  a  general  recognition  nowadays  that  in  many  countries  declared 
exchange rate regimes do not always correspond to the actual exchange rate policies. The 
discrepancies between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes are well documented and 
have become a research topic in its own right.
2 
In this paper we focus on the official (de jure) exchange rate regimes, which countries 
declare as the regimes they find themselves in. Despite of the fact that a country may renege 
on the declared regime, the announcement itself reflects the view of the authority as to which 
exchange arrangement is the most appropriate for the country, and thus can influence market 
expectations about the behaviour of the exchange rate as well as of the monetary policy. 
Moreover, in order to understand why countries deviate from the chosen regimes one needs to 
understand how these choices are made in the first place. This is the aim of this paper.  
Countries  report  their  exchange  arrangements  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF), which publishes its regime classifications based on these reports in the Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). In the early years after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, the IMF classified all exchange arrangements under 
two broad rubrics: pegged regimes or more flexible regimes, with pegs to a single foreign 
currency, to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and to other composite currencies being finer 
categories  under  the  former,  and  regimes  with  limited  flexibility,  with  exchange-rate 
adjustments according to indicators, and with independently floating rates being sub-headings 
                                                
2 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2003), von Hagen 
and Zhou (2002b).   7 
under  the  latter.  For  the  most  part  of  the  1980s  and  the  1990s,  the  IMF  identified  eight 
exchange rate regimes based on official information (see the left column of Table 2). On 
January 1, 1999, the IMF switched to a new scheme to classify exchange rate regimes (see the 
right  column  of  Table  2).  The  change  reflects  the  IMF’s  efforts  to  keep  its  regime 
nomenclature  a  reasonably  good  labelling  of  actual  exchange  rate  policies.  The  new 
classification system takes into account the actual behaviour of the exchange rate, but it is still 
heavily influenced by official declarations, and differs-in some cases substantially-from those 
regime classifications based purely on observed exchange rate movements (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2003). For this reason we still treat the new IMF 
classification as official regimes.
3 
        [ Table 2 is about here. ] 
Table 3 reports the evolution of exchange rate regimes in developing countries in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. By “developing countries” we mean all the IMF member 
countries not classified as industrial countries. Emerging market economies and transition 
economies are included in our sample. Under the old IMF classification, the share of single-
currency pegs and SDR pegs has been on the steady decline, from 69% in the late 1970s down 
to 29% in 1996-1997. The share of pegs to other composite currencies, in contrast, maintained 
its position at around 11%, although they seemed to be in favour in the late 1980s. Managed 
floating regimes have been rising in share since the late 1970s, and so did freely floating 
regimes since the early 1980s. The regimes with limited flexibility or rules-based adjustments 
form the smallest group and have been losing ground since the early 1980s. Under the new 
                                                
3 There are attempts to use the new IMF scheme backwards to classify exchange rate regimes in earlier years. 
Von Hagen and Zhou (2002a) apply it to a sample of 25 transition economies in the 1990s. Bubula and Ötker-
Robe (2002) apply it to all the IMF member countries in the 1990s, but they call it a “de facto” classification.   8 
IMF classification, the total share of managed and independently floating regimes is reduced, 
as some of them are reclassified into less flexible exchange rate regimes.
4  
        [ Table 3 is about here. ] 
For the multinomial analysis discussed below, we combine exchange arrangements to 
form three broad regimes. The basic classification treats exchange arrangements 1, 2, and 3 as 
fixed regimes, 4, 5, and 6 as intermediate regimes, and 7 and 8 as flexible regimes. We also 
use an alternative classification, with regimes 3 and 7 reclassified as intermediate ones, since 
these two regimes may bear more resemblance to intermediate regimes than to hard pegs or to 
freely floating regimes. 
 
2.2  The determinants of regime choices 
Based on theoretical suggestions and empirical findings we consider four groups of 
potential regime determinants: the OCA fundamentals, the stabilization considerations, the 
currency crises factors, and political and institutional features. The exact construction of the 
data and data sources are reported in the Appendix. For the OCA fundamentals, we include 
economic  openness  (OPEN,  measured  by  the  ratio  of  trade  to  GDP),  geographical 
concentration of trade (GCON, measured by the share of the largest trading partner in total 
trade), economic size (SIZE, measured by GDP in logarithm), level of economic development 
(LEVEL, measured by per capita GDP in logarithm), and degree of financial development 
(FINDEV, measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP).  
To reflect stabilization strategies, we consider three variables: inflation performance 
(CPINF, measured by the transformed consumer price inflation rates,
5  ) 1 /( p p + ), relative 
price  shocks  (RERVOL,  proxied  by  the  volatility  of  rear  effective  exchange  rates),  and 
                                                
4 This is consistent with the “fear of floating” phenomenon dubbed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
5 This is aimed at avoiding bias caused by some hyperinflationary episodes. See Ghosh et al. (1997).   9 
domestic monetary shocks (NOMSHK, proxied by volatility of broad money growth rates). 
Some factors can influence the risks of currency crises and therefore the chances for some 
regimes being adopted. These factors include international reserves adequacy (RESERVE, 
measured by the ratio of non-gold  reserves to broad money), public finance performance 
(FISCAL, measured by the ratio of government budget surpluses (+) or deficits (-) to GDP), 
and current account positions (CA, measured by the ratio of current account surpluses (+) or 
deficits  (-)  to  GDP).  Finally,  political  and  institutional  features  are  also  found  to  be 
influencing regime choices, so we consider three variables in this regard: financial openness 
(KCONTR, the degree of capital controls, inversely related to financial openness), overall 
freedom  of  the  society  (FREEIDX,  an  index  of  political  freedom  and  civil  liberty),  and 
political instability (POLINST, proxied by frequency of changes in political powers). 
        [ Table 4 is about here. ] 
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviations of the regime determinants over the 
full sample. Means of each variable across three regime groups are also reported, and z-tests 
for the null hypothesis of equal means across regimes are conducted. A rough impression is 
that on average the three regimes are similar in some perspectives, e.g. trade concentration, 
real exchange rate volatility, or public finance, but differ significantly from each other on 
other dimensions, including economic sizes, financial openness, and freedom scores (see the 
two far-right columns of Table 4).  Moreover, the  mean values of most variables  are not 
monotonically increasing or decreasing in the rising flexibility of regimes, suggesting that 
these variables have qualitatively different impacts on intermediate and flexible regimes, both 
relative to fixed ones. This implies that a non-ordered multinomial approach should be more 
appropriate than either binary or ordered choice structures. We also check correlations among 
the  potential regime determinants  (see Table 5). Since the highest correlation in absolute   10 
values is 0.39, and most of the correlations are below 0.30, Table 5 does not indicate any 
serious multicolinearity.  
        [ Table 5 is about here. ] 
 
 
3.  A Multinomial Random Effects Panel Model 
 
3.1  The model specifications 
We use  , ..., , 1 , 0 , ..., , 2 , 1 , i it T t N i Y = =  to denote the exchange rate regime choice of 
country  i  in  year  t,  with  2 , 1 , 0 = it Y   for  fixed,  intermediate,  and  flexible  regimes, 
respectively.
6 Countries choose their regimes based on the principle of utility maximization, 
which implies that 
, , 2 , 1 , 0 , ), Pr( ) Pr( j k k j U U j Y itk itj it ¹ = > = =         (1) 
where  itj U  denotes the unobserved utility that country i derives in year t from regime j. We 
assume that the random utility  itj U  consists of a predetermined component  itj V , which is linear 
in  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables  it x ,  and  a  random  error  itj u ,  which  has  an  error 
component structure. More specifically, 
  itj itj itj u V U + = ,                      (2a) 
  it j itj V x b = ,                       (2b) 
  itj ij itj u e a + = ,                      (2c) 
where  j b  is a row vector of coefficients,  ij a  reflects country-specific, regime-dependent, and 
time-invariant  heterogeneity,  and  itj e   is  independently  and  identically  distributed  (i.i.d.) 
                                                
6 Note that the panel is unbalanced as Ti varies across i.   11 
across countries, years, and regimes. Because only the utility differences matter for regime 
choices, we normalize  0 0 º it U  for all i and t. Let  )' , ( 2 1 i i i a a a =  and assume that  i a  has a 
bivariate normal distribution characterized by 











.              (3) 
This leads to the static version of the random effect panel model. For simplicity we assume 
that  i a  is i.i.d. across countries and years. Note that despite of this simplification, the random 
error  itj u  is serially correlated due to the existence of  ij a , which provides one mechanism to 
account for the dynamic linkage in regime choices. 
Another method to account for serial correlation is to assume that lagged regime choices 
enter  the  determination  of  current  choices,  which  gives  rise  to  state  dependence  in  the 
decision-making process.
7 Let  } { j Y d it itj = =1  be the dummy for regime j, with 1{} being an 
indicator function generating a value of unity if the statement in brackets is true, and define 
)' , ( 2 1 it it it d d = d . Our specification of this dynamic model is  
  0 , 1 > + = - t V it j it j itj x d b g .                  (4) 
Note  that  we  drop  the  dummy  for  fixed  regimes  ( 0 it d )  to  avoid  multicolinearity  in  the 
regressors. This specification corresponds to a first-order Markov chain in regime transition, 
with the coefficient vector  ) , ( 2 1 j j j g g g =  measuring the direct influence of lagged regime 
choices on the current decision, after controlling for the influence of other factors as well as of 
country  heterogeneity.  The  initial  regime  choices  at  0 = t   are  treated  as  non-stochastic 
                                                
7 Heckman (1981a) defined spurious state dependence as that caused by unobservable common effects, while 
that due to past regime choices is true state dependence.   12 




3.2  Estimation procedure 
In order to make the model operational, we assume that the distribution of the error term 
itj e  is i.i.d. Type I extreme value, resulting in a logit specification of the model. Let the 
probability for  j Yit =  conditional on  itj V  and  i a  be denoted by  i itj P a | . We have 
    i j
V
V
V j Y P
k ik itk
ij itj





, 2 , 1 , 0 ,
) exp(
) exp(
) , | Pr( | 2
0 a
a
a a ,     (5) 
with  0 0 º it V  and  0 0 º i a  for normalization. Equation (5) applies for all t if (2b) is used, and 
for  0 > t  if (4) is used.  
  The probability for  j Yit =  conditional only on observed  itj V  is denoted by  itj P , which 
can be obtained by integrating out  i a  from  i itj P a | . That is,  
￿ =
i
i i i itj itj f P P
a a a a d ) ( ) | ( ,                  (6) 
with  f  denoting the density of  i a . It is clear from (6) that  itj P  is the expectation of  i itj P a |  
over the domain of  i a . In the following estimation  itj P  is approximated by a simulated mean 
of  i itj P a | . The simulation is conducted using the GHK simulator.
9 The basic approach is to 
draw random numbers 
r
i a  from the distribution (3), calculate 
r
i itj P a |  for each draw using (5), 
                                                
8 A more complicated specification assumes that at the initial stage the data generating process is in equilibrium, 
so the probability for the initial choices is equal to the limiting marginal probability (Hsiao, 1986). An alternative 
specification is to model the initial probability as a reduced-form probability depending on all pre-sample 
exogenous explanatory variables (Heckman, 1981b). 
9 The GHK simulator gets its name from the works by Geweke (1991), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998), and 
Keane (1994).   13 
repeat the process for R times, and then take the average over R draws as an approximation of 
itj P . In short, 












a .                    (7) 
Then the simulated log-likelihood function for the whole sample is given by 
￿ ￿ ￿
* * =
i t k itk itk P d L log log ,                (8) 




4  Results and Discussions 
 
We estimate both static and dynamic versions of the random effects panel model. Each 
version  is  estimated  using  the  basic  and  the  alternative  regime  classification.  For  each 
specification we estimate the model four times, adding one group of variables at each time. 
The sample sizes vary across estimations, with the number of countries ranging from 94 to 
128 and the number of observations from 1189 to 2230. The time span is usually 1981 to 
1999, except when political and institutional variables are added in the fourth estimation, for 
which the time span ends at 1994 due to lack of data on POLINST afterwards. For each 
estimation we generally set the number of random draws of 
r
i a  at  30 = R .
11 In order to reduce 
the endogeneity bias, all explanatory variables (except for the regime dummies) are lagged by 
one year. We also include dummies for each five-year interval since 1986, with 1981-1985 as 
                                                
10 See Train (2002) for a detailed discussion on the estimation procedure. 
11 We also experiment with other values of R, e.g. 25 or 20, whose results are not very different from those 
reported here.   14 
the omitted period.
12 Because we normalize the utility associated with fixed regimes to zero, 
the coefficients reported in Table 6 and Table 7 ( 2 , 1 , , = j j j g b )  indicate the qualitative 
impacts on the utility associated with regime j relative to fixed regimes. Therefore, a positive 
(negative) coefficient means that an increase in the variable raises (reduces) the utility of 
regime j, and henceforth its probability of being adopted, relative to fixed regimes. 
 
4.1  Results of the static model 
Table 6a reports the results of the static model with the basic regime classification. It is 
clear from Table 6a that, from a static point of view, the OCA fundamentals play an important 
role in the determination of exchange rate regime choices, as most of them have significant 
coefficients in the estimations. The results suggest that countries more open to foreign trade 
are  more  likely  to  adopt  flexible  regimes,  but  less  likely  to  choose  intermediate  ones. 
Moreover,  the  more  geographically  concentrated  the  foreign  trade  is,  the  more  likely 
intermediate and flexible regimes are selected. This is consistent with the observation that 
developing countries are very concerned with their competitiveness in international markets, 
especially in their major trading partners, and countries prefer more flexible regimes since 
they can  help avoid prolonged exchange rate misalignment.  
        [ Table 6a is about here. ] 
Economic size and development level also influence regime choices in significant ways. 
In  general,  larger  developing  countries  are  less  likely  to  peg,  probably  reflecting  their 
reluctance to give up monetary autonomy. Richer developing countries favour intermediate 
regimes and will choose flexible regimes with the lowest probability. The positive association 
between LEVEL (per capita GDP) and intermediate regimes is mainly caused by the choice of 
                                                
12 We use period instead of annual dummies to increase degrees of freedom and to avoid convergence problems 
frequently encountered if annual dummies are used.   15 
a handful of rich countries  in the Gulf region and a  few middle-income Latin American 
countries of intermediate regimes. A more general implication is that rich countries tend to 
have fixed regimes and poor countries ones have flexible regimes. One explanation is that rich 
countries have deeper and broader financial markets, which can help the nation to maintain 
stable exchange rates. This is consistent with negative coefficients for FINDEV, which imply 
that countries with more developed financial markets tend to favour fixed regimes over the 
other two options. 
Among the stabilization variables, high inflation (CPINF) definitely raises the chances 
for intermediate and flexible regimes, and the higher the inflation rate, the more flexible the 
regimes will be. This is against the notion that countries use the exchange rate anchor to curb 
inflation, but consistent with the difficulties to keep exchange rates stable when inflation is 
rampant. As a proxy for real shocks, real exchange rate volatility (RERVOL) has-against our 
expectation-negative  coefficients,  indicating  that  countries  tend  choose  fixed  regimes  in 
response to large real exchange rate variations. This is probably the case when exchange rate 
fluctuation is the main source of relative price movements, so fixing the nominal exchange 
rate eliminates one major source of real exchange rate variations.
13 The proxy for nominal 
shocks  (NOMSHK),  in  contrast,  bears  expected  signs,  pointing  to  the  direction  of  fixed 
regimes when the size of domestic monetary shocks is large. 
The variables reflecting currency crises risks seem to be more relevant for intermediate 
regimes than for flexible regimes, consistent with the views that intermediate regimes are 
more  vulnerable to  currency  crises  than  either  fixed  or  flexible  ones. But  the  results are 
somewhat  sensitive  to  the  addition  of  political  and  institutional  variables.  When  these 
variables  bear  significant  coefficients,  the  signs  suggest  that  sufficient  foreign  exchange 
                                                
13 Another possibility, which hints on reverse causality, is that fixed regimes prevents inflation differentials from 
being absorbed by exchange rate movements, henceforth higher real exchange rate volatility.   16 
reserves,  large  budget  deficits  (negative  FISCAL),  and  current  account  surpluses  make 
intermediate regimes more likely. The impacts of these variables for flexible regimes are-
although less significant-qualitatively the same. While it is reasonable to associate public 
finance problems with increased risks of crises and, therefore, with lower probability for fixed 
regimes, it is a bit puzzling to see countries with large current account deficits choose fixed 
regimes instead of more flexible ones. It probably reflects a reverse causality: countries with 
more flexible exchange rates are more able to maintain external competitiveness and have 
fewer balance-of-payments problems. 
The political and institutional variables seem to be less important than other variables. 
Intensive capital controls are more likely associated with intermediate regimes than with fixed 
or  flexible  regimes,  but  the  results  are  not  statistically  significant.  Countries  with  higher 
degree of political freedom and civil liberty have a preference for flexible regimes, which is 
significantly stronger than that for intermediate or fixed regimes. This is consistent with the 
findings of some empirical studies that countries with less democratic political regimes tend 
to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes.
14 However, political instability seems to make both 
fixed and flexible regimes more likely relative to intermediate regimes, while the empirical 
literature usually finds that fixed regimes tend to be significantly less favoured than flexible 
regimes in case of political instability. 
To  check  the  robustness  of  these  findings,  Table  6b  reports  results  based  on  the 
alternative regime classification. In general the results are similar to those reported above, 
showing that these findings are robust to alternative regime classifications. However, there are 
several interesting differences. First of all, geographical concentration (GCON) now works 
strongly  against  intermediate  and  flexible  regimes.  A  closer  look  at  the  data  shows  that 
countries  with  pegs  to  some  self-defined  composite  currencies  (regime  type  3)  have  on 
                                                
14 See, for example, Méon and Rizzo (2002).   17 
average very low values of GCON. When these composite currency pegs are reclassified from 
fixed  regimes to intermediate  ones,  they  pull  down  the  average values of  GCON for the 
intermediate group, and leave the fixed group consisting only of single currency pegs and 
SDR pegs, which tend to be associated with highly concentrated trade structure. As a result, 
based on the alternative regime classification, high degree of trade concentration makes fixed 
regimes more likely. 
        [ Table 6b is about here. ] 
Moreover,  the  role  of  government  budget  deficits  for  regime  choices  seem  to  be 
sensitive to the inclusion of political and institutional variables. The changes in signs suggest 
that when political and institutional features are controlled for, countries have a tendency to 
use fixed regimes to help strengthen fiscal discipline, and this tendency is more obvious when 
the  alternative  regime  classification  is  used.  And  the  political  and  institutional  variables 
themselves are also more important for regime choices under the alternative classification, as 
evidenced  by  more  significant  coefficients  than  before.  In  general  the  strong  association 
between intermediate regimes and intensive capital controls is even more significant, and so is 
the case for the association between fixed regimes and low degree of overall freedom. 
 
4.2  Results of the dynamic model 
We now turn to the results of the dynamic model. The dummy for intermediate regimes 
in the previous year is LAGINT and that for flexible ones is LAGFLEX. It is clear form Table 
7a that past regime choices enter significantly into the decision-making process for current 
regime choices, and the results are robust to the addition of explanatory variables. There is 
strong  state  dependence  in  regime  choices:  having  a  fixed  regime  in  the  previous  year 
significantly reduces the probability of adopting other regimes in this year, and having an 
intermediate or a flexible regime previously makes it more likely to choose for the current   18 
period either of these two regimes relative to fixed ones. Moreover, a comparison of the 
magnitudes of the relevant coefficients shows that being in an intermediate regime in the 
previous year raises the chance for the same regime this year by a larger margin than for 
flexible ones, and vice versa for flexible regimes. All these conform well with the fact that 
regime choices tend to be persistent and suggests that current regime choices depend crucially 
on past choices. Using Heckman (1981a)’s terminology, there exists “true” state dependence 
in the choice of exchange rate regimes, even after controlling for the existence of “spurious” 
state dependence due to unobserved common effects. 
        [ Table 7a is about here. ] 
Some explanatory variables see their significance levels reduced in the dynamic model, 
reflecting the possibility that in the static model these variables also capture some part of the 
influence from lagged regime choices, and when these additional influences are controlled in 
the dynamic model, the impact of these variables tends to be weaker than before. The results 
are nevertheless similar to those of the static model in terms of the signs of the coefficients, 
suggesting  that  the  qualitative implications  derived  above  still  hold.  In  general, countries 
more open to foreign trade, with more concentrated trade structures, or larger in economic 
sizes tend to have flexible regimes, while those with low income levels or less developed 
financial systems tend to have fixed regimes.  
The stabilization variables still play significant roles in the determination of exchange 
rate regime choices, except for the proxy for nominal shocks (NOMSHK), which becomes 
insignificant in almost all cases but nevertheless still points to the direction that fixed regimes 
will be preferred when nominal shocks are substantial. As before, high inflation makes fixed 
regimes less tenable and, as a result, less attractive, while large real exchange rate volatility, 
in contrast, makes them more preferable. The variables related to currency crises risks and 
those reflecting political and institutional features appear to be playing only a limited role in   19 
the  determination  of  regime  choices,  as  most  of  them  are  insignificant  in  the  dynamic 
framework. 
As a robustness check we estimate the dynamic model using the alternative regime 
classification (see  Table 7b). The results  are  not sensitive  to the reclassification of some 
controversial exchange arrangements.  In general  the coefficients reported in Table  7b are 
comparable to those listed in Table7a, and the significance levels are either unchanged or 
slightly higher than in previous estimations.  
        [ Table 7b is about here. ] 
The explanatory power of the dynamic model is much higher than that of the static 
model, thanks to the persistence in regime choices. Based on the estimates of the static model, 
the share of correctly explained regime choices ranges from 57% to 74%. Based on the results 
of the dynamic model, in contrast, the ratio of right prediction is above 90%. Moreover, the 
sizes  of  the  estimated  variance  and  covariance  of  country-specific  random  effects 
( ) 22 12 11 , , s s s   are  usually  smaller  in  the  dynamic  model  than  in  the  static  one.  This  is 
because in the static model the  i a  terms capture not only the influence of unobserved country 
heterogeneity, but also part of the influence of true state dependence. In the dynamic model, 
the latter part of variance is captured by lagged regime dummies, so the estimated variance-
covariance of  i a   tends to be reduced accordingly. However, in  general the variance and 
covariance of country-specific random effects are fairly small. Since the  i a  terms capture 
country  heterogeneity  caused  by  all  the  potential  regime  determinants  excluded  from  the 
model, small variance and covariance may be consistent with the view that, after including so 
many  regime  determinants,  the  problem  of  omitted  variables  as  well  as  of  country 
heterogeneity is finally not so important. 
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5  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we apply simulation-based estimation techniques to the analysis of the 
choices of exchange rate regimes in developing countries since the fall of the Bretton Woods 
System. We expand the conventional fixed-vs.-flexible dichotomy into a trichotomous choice 
structure,  with  fixed,  intermediate,  and  flexible  regimes  as  three  options.  We  use  a  non-
ordered multinomial framework to allow the possibility that the influence of some variables 
on regime choices are not monotonically increasing or decreasing in the underlying regime 
flexibility. Moreover, we model the persistence in the regime choices of the same country by 
including country-specific time-invariant heterogeneity, or by including past regime choices 
in the decision on the current ones. We construct a random-effects multinomial panel model 
for the choices of exchange rate regimes and estimate the model using the GHK simulator. 
We  consider  a  wide  range  of  potential  regime  determinants,  including  the  OCA 
fundamentals,  stabilization  strategies,  currency  crises  risks,  and  political  and  institutional 
features.  In  general,  all  these  variables  have  more  or  less  explanatory  power  for  the 
determination of regime choices, but tend to be less significant in the dynamic model than in 
the static one. The regime persistence is well explained by lagged regime dummies, indicating 
that it is largely due to significant “true” state dependence in the decision process.  
 
 
Appendix: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
 
We  construct  the  variables  from  various  sources.  Five  variables  (CA,  FISCAL, 
NOMSHK, OPEN, and RERVOL) are either directly taken from the CD-ROM attached to   21 
Ghosh  et  al.  (2002),  or  constructed  based  on  the  data  from  this  source.  The  detailed 
information on data construction and sources are as follows: 
CA:  Current  account  balance,  normalized  by  GDP.  Data  source  is  the  IMF,  World 
Economic Outlook Database. 
CPINF: Transformed consumer price inflation rates (
* p ). The transformation uses the 
formula  ) 1 /( p p p + =
* , with p  denoting the raw data series. Data source is the IMF, World 
Economic Outlook Database. 
FINDEV: Broad money, normalized by GDP. Broad money is the sum of “money” and 
“quasi-money”. Data source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
FISCAL: Central government budget balance, normalized by GDP. Data source is the 
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
FREEIDX: Index of political freedom and civil liberty. The index is constructed by first 
averaging the scores of political rights and of civil liberties (each on a 1-7 scale) obtained 
from the Freedom House, and then subtracting the average scores from 8. The index is again 
on a 1-7 scale but with higher values representing higher degrees of freedom. 
GCON: Share of trade with the largest trading partner in the total trade with the ten 
largest trading partners. Data source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
KCONTR: Intensity of capital controls, defined as the sum of the dummies for (1) the 
existence of multiple or dual exchange rates, (2) the existence of restrictions on payments of 
current transactions, (3) the existence of restrictions on payments of capital transactions, and 
(4)  the  existence  of  surrender  requirements  for  export  proceeds.  Data source  is  the  IMF, 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
LEVEL: Per capita GDP in US dollars and then in logarithms. Data source is the IMF, 
World Economic Outlook Database.   22 
NOMSHK: Average absolute deviation of the transformed growth rate of broad money 
(
* m ) from the four-year backward moving average. The transformation uses the formula 
) 1 /( m m m + =
* ,  with  m  denoting  the  raw  data  series.  Data  source  is  the  IMF,  World 
Economic Outlook Database. 
OPEN: The sum of exports and imports of goods and services, normalized by GDP. 
Data source is the IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
POLINST: A measure of political instability, defined as the sum of (1) the number of 
changes in effective executives of a country in each year, and (2) a dummy for the year in 
which legislative election takes place. Data source is the Polity III dataset from Harvard-CID 
database on political institutions. 
RERVOL: Standard deviation of monthly changes of real effective exchange rate in 
each year. Data source is the IMF, Information Notice System. 
RESERVE: Non-gold international reserves, normalized by broad money. Data source 
is the IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
SIZE: Gross Domestic Products in current prices, expressed in billions of US dollars 
and then in logarithms. Data source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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Table 1 
Empirical Studies on the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: A Selected Overview
(1) 






































(3)  O  O  B  B, O  B,O,M  B  B  B, O  B  B  O  B  B, M  O 
Methods
(4)  CS  CS  PP  PP  CS  PP  CS  CS  PP  REP  CS  PP  CS  PP 
Variables
(5)                             
Trade openness  +*  -  +  +*  +*/-      -*  +*  -*  +  -*  +*  +* 
Com. Concentr.  +*    -*    +*            -*      -* 
Geo. Concentr.  +*  -/+  -  +*  -*      +*      -  +*  +/-  +* 
Economic size  -  -*    -*  -      -*      -  -*  -*  + 
Dev. level      -*    +*  -*/+*  +*  +*      -/+  +*  +*/-  -* 
Nominal shocks    +*  +*  +*    +*      -           
Real shocks          -  -*  -      +*  -*    -/+*   
Home inflation    -    -*    -*  -*  -*      -*    -*  +* 
RER variation      -*      -*  -*              +/- 
Foreign inflation    -*    -*            +*    +*     
Reserve            +*    -*    -  +*    -/+  +* 
Fiscal balance                +*            + 
Current account              +*  +/-*             
Capital mobility      +*  -*  -/+            +*    +/-   
Pol. instability            -*  -*    -*  -*  +  -*  -*   
Capital controls            +*      +*    +    +*/-   
Notes: 
(1) The studies included in the table are: (I) Dreyer, 1978; (II) Melvin, 1985; (III) Savvides, 1990; (IV) Savvides, 1993; (V) Honkapohja and 
Pikkarainen, 1994; (VI) Edwards, 1996; (VII) Edwards, 1998; (VIII) Rizzo, 1998; (IX) Bernhard and Leblang, 1999; (X) Berger et al., 2000; (XI) 
Poirson, 2001; (XII) Méon and Rizzo, 2002; (XIII) Juhn and Mauro, 2002; (XIV) von Hagen and Zhou, 2002a. 
(2) The sample covers (a) developing countries, (b) developed and developing countries, (c) developed countries, or (d) transition economies. 
(3) Regimes are classified as binary choices (B), ordered choices with three regimes (O), or non-ordered multiple choices with three regimes (M). 
(4) Methods of estimation include cross-section (CS), pooled panel (PP), and random-effect panel (REP). 
(5) A positive (+) sign means that the variable is positively associated with the probability of adopting fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes. An 
asterisk (*) means that the coefficient is generally significant at 10% or higher levels.   28 
Table 2 
The IMF Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes  
Code  Old Classification: before1998
(1)  New Classification: since 1998
(2) 
1  Single currency peg  No separate legal tender 
2  SDR peg  Currency board arrangements 
3  Other composite currency peg  Other conventional fixed pegs 
4  Flexibility limited vis-à-vis a single currency  Horizontal bands 
5  Flexibility limited vis-à-vis a group of  
   currencies 
Crawling pegs 
6  Exchange rate adjusted according to a set of      
   indicators 
Crawling bands 
7  Other managed floating  Managed floating with no pre- 
   announced path for the exchange rate 
8  Independently floating  Independently floating 
Source: IMF, AREAER (various issues). 
Notes:  
(1) For the period 1977-1981, regime types 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 can be identified. For the period 
1982-1995, all the 8 regime types can be identified. For the period 1996-1997, regime type 6 
is excluded from the classification. 
(2) The new classification started on January 1, 1999, which was used as the classification for 
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Table 3 
Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries: 1977-2000
 
1977-1980  1981-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995  1996-1997  1998-2000   
Code
(1)  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs.  % 
1, 2  304  68.6  335  54.9  310  47.6  271  35.8  92  29.1  94  19.8 
3  57  12.9  110  18.0  136  20.9  125  16.5  36  11.4  127  26.8 
4, 5, 6  15  3.4  53  8.7  40  6.1  39  5.2  10  3.2  57  12.0 
7  0  0.0  66  10.8  102  15.7  137  18.1  89  28.2  78  16.5 
8  67  15.1  46  7.5  63  9.7  185  24.4  89  28.2  118  24.9 
Total  443  100.0  610  100.0  651  100.0  757  100.0  316  100.0  474  100.0 
Country  115  127  132  158  158  158 
Source: Own calculations based on the IMF, AREAER (various issues). 
Note:  
(1) For the meanings of the regime codes, see Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Regime Determinants  
  Full Sample  Fix
(1)  Inter
(1)  Flex
(1)  z-statistics 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  Mean  Mean  Inter-Fix
  Flex-Fix 
OPEN  0.813  0.650  0.856  0.768  0.741  -1.269  -3.194 
GCON  0.361  0.136  0.358  0.393  0.358  0.500  -0.011 
SIZE  1.539  2.060  0.889  2.995  2.450  30.703  43.456 
LEVEL  6.970  1.243  6.903  7.985  6.885  15.770  -0.519 
FINDEV  0.464  0.827  0.526  0.408  0.364  -1.723  -4.494 
CPINF  0.148  0.190  0.111  0.145  0.217  0.505  2.949 
RERVOL  0.035  0.094  0.032  0.041  0.038  0.131  0.152 
NOMSHK  0.065  0.064  0.063  0.052  0.070  -0.170  0.193 
RESERVE  0.341  0.411  0.342  0.347  0.337  0.074  -0.141 
FISCAL  -0.049  0.080  -0.050  -0.043  -0.048  0.103  0.069 
CA  -0.050  0.134  -0.059  -0.010  -0.043  0.714  0.439 
KCONTR  2.417  1.265  2.483  1.949  2.386  -7.789  -2.689 
FREEIDX  3.886  1.863  3.765  3.925  4.109  2.337  9.576 
POLINST  0.351  0.655  0.326  0.282  0.420  -0.643  2.610 
Notes: 
(1) “Fix”, “Inter”, or “Flex” stands for fixed, intermediate, or flexible regimes, respectively, 
based on the basic regime classification. The z-statistics are for the null hypothesis of equal 
means across two regimes, with numbers in bold significant at 5% level and numbers in italic 
significant at 10% level. 
 Table 5 
Correlation Matrix 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
1     OPEN  1.00                           
2     GCON  0.06  1.00                         
3     SIZE  -0.29  -0.09  1.00                       
4     LEVEL  0.30  0.16  0.35  1.00                     
5     FINDEV  0.06  -0.09  -0.01  0.08  1.00                   
6     CPINF  -0.12  -0.07  0.12  -0.15  -0.03  1.00                 
7     RERVOL  -0.08  -0.07  -0.02  -0.14  0.01  0.38  1.00               
8     NOMSHK  -0.02  -0.03  -0.14  -0.17  -0.10  0.34  0.13  1.00             
9     RESERVE  0.10  0.01  -0.15  0.00  -0.10  -0.02  0.01  0.06  1.00           
10     FISCAL  -0.04  0.10  0.15  0.20  -0.06  -0.10  -0.11  -0.10  0.16  1.00         
11     CA  -0.08  0.04  0.23  0.28  -0.01  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  0.07  0.39  1.00       
12     KCONTR  -0.27  -0.09  0.02  -0.37  -0.01  0.25  0.13  0.04  -0.09  -0.10  -0.16  1.00     
13     FREEIDX  0.20  0.26  -0.05  0.34  -0.01  -0.02  -0.07  -0.11  0.07  0.07  0.03  -0.11  1.00   
14     POLINST  -0.03  0.06  0.11  0.03  -0.00  0.09  0.07  0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.04  0.14  1.00 
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Table 6a 
Static Random Effects Panel Model Estimations, with the Basic Regime Classification 
  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2 
OPEN  -0.04 (0.19)  0.47** (0.12)  -0.13 (0.34)  0.52** (0.12)  -0.45* (0.26)  0.44** (0.11)  -0.15 (0.73)  1.40** (0.27) 
GCON  1.83** (0.70)  1.11** (0.44)  2.06** (0.81)  1.80** (0.61)  1.98** (0.75)  1.88** (0.48)  0.68 (1.84)  1.19* (0.67) 
SIZE  0.41** (0.07)  0.60** (0.05)  0.39** (0.07)  0.61** (0.08)  0.44** (0.07)  0.62** (0.05)  0.34** (0.15)  0.63** (0.07) 
LEVEL  0.65** (0.09)  -0.35** (0.08)  0.71** (0.12)  -0.41** (0.08)  0.71** (0.11)  -0.38** (0.07)  0.87** (0.27)  -0.67** (0.13) 
FINDEV  -2.14** (0.48)  -1.82** (0.26)  -2.09** (0.52)  -1.42** (0.32)  -1.55** (0.56)  -1.11** (0.30)  -2.18* (1.20)  -1.66** (0.56) 
CPINF      5.22** (0.96)  6.39** (0.87)  5.57** (0.86)  6.59** (0.65)  6.13** (1.27)  6.33** (0.78) 
RERVOL      -11.55** (4.33)  -6.65** (1.91)  -11.89** (4.29)  -6.99** (1.71)  -15.28** (5.31)  -7.48** (1.93) 
NOMSHK      -3.78* (2.23)  -2.15* (1.21)  -5.92** (2.32)  -3.00** (1.21)  -2.17 (3.43)  -1.41 (1.63) 
RESERVE          2.38** (0.43)  0.75** (0.28)  3.14** (0.75)  -0.79* (0.48) 
FISCAL          -5.55** (1.45)  -1.95 (1.22)  -0.55 (2.41)  -0.45 (1.51) 
CA          2.18** (0.92)  1.04 (0.86)  -1.09 (1.84)  1.62 (1.72) 
KCONTR              0.14 (0.18)  -0.10 (0.07) 
FREEIDX              -0.12 (0.13)  0.32** (0.05) 
POLINST              -0.52** (0.26)  -0.05 (0.11) 
￿11  0.08 (0.20)  0.14 (0.56)  0.03 (0.12)  0.78 (0.81) 
￿12  0.07 (0.17)  0.18 (0.46)  0.05 (0.13)  0.02 (0.44) 











Countries  128  124  118  94 
Obs.
(1)  1266 / 170 / 794 / 2230  1200 / 163 / 769 / 2132  1150 / 158 / 735 / 2043  656 / 87 / 448 / 1191 
% pred.
(2)  81.4 / 6.5 / 63.4 / 69.2  84.5 / 6.7 / 67.1 / 72.3  85.7 / 13.9 / 67.3 / 73.5  83.4 / 6.9 / 67.0 / 71.6 
Notes: * or ** indicates significance at 10% or 5% level, respectively. Constants and period dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
(1) Number of observations for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
(2) Correct predictions for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
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Table 6b 
Static Random Effects Panel Model Estimations, with the Alternative Regime Classification 
  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2  ￿1  ￿2 
OPEN  0.53* (0.29)  0.64** (0.30)  0.12 (0.12)  0.24 (0.19)  0,03 (0,08)  0,24 (0,16)  2,66** (0,50)  3,00** (0,54) 
GCON  -5.02** (1.38)  -3.66** (1.42)  -2.98** (0.48)  -1.11* (0.66)  -3,17** (0,48)  -1,05 (0,66)  -6,05** (1,27)  -3,04** (1,24) 
SIZE  1.22** (0.31)  1.24** (0.31)  0.41** (0.06)  0.43** (0.07)  0,46** (0,04)  0,45** (0,07)  0,96** (0,16)  0,58** (0,15) 
LEVEL  0.14 (0.14)  -0.38** (0.14)  0.11* (0.06)  -0.42** (0.08)  0,15** (0,06)  -0,38** (0,11)  -0,20 (0,14)  -0,94** (0,18) 
FINDEV  -0.63* (0.32)  -2.13** (0.52)  -0.19** (0.09)  -1.37** (0.41)  -0,04 (0,06)  -1,95** (0,57)  -0,13 (0,26)  -2,70** (0,93) 
CPINF      5.20** (0.71)  7.22** (0.79)  5,58** (0,66)  7,72** (0,83)  4,40** (0,94)  8,23** (1,04) 
RERVOL      -16.74** (2.45)  -8.90** (2.09)  -16,05** (2,33)  -9,20** (2,09)  -14,68** (3,15)  -10,38** (2,32) 
NOMSHK      -7.16** (1.33)  -7.73** (1.68)  -8,84** (1,33)  -9,61** (1,88)  -6,25** (2,20)  -6,26** (2,60) 
RESERVE          1,96** (0,28)  1,33** (0,40)  0,51 (0,49)  -0,39 (0,63) 
FISCAL          -3,54** (1,05)  -3,10* (1,86)  6,24** (1,86)  5,54** (2,41) 
CA          1,61** (0,66)  2,55** (1,22)  -3,11** (1,26)  1,84 (1,65) 
KCONTR               0,25** (0,12)  -0,35** (0,14) 
FREEIDX              0,23** (0,07)  0,51** (0,08) 
POLINST              0,20 (0,18)  0,08 (0,19) 
￿11  20.41* (12.24)  0.45 (0.59)  0.05 (0.16)  1.50 (1.49) 
￿12  19.50 (12.09)  0.68 (0.62)  0.22 (0.42)  0.20 (0.91) 











Countries  128  124  118  94 
Obs.
(1)  814 / 1025 / 391 / 2230  756 / 1003 / 373 / 2132  726 / 968 / 349 / 2043  431 / 561 / 199 / 1191 
% pred.
(2)  49.6 / 72.5 / 32.0 / 57.0  62.3 / 75.0 / 27.9 / 62.2  66.4 / 77.2 / 22.9 / 64.1  75.4 / 79.7 / 34.7 / 70.6 
Notes: * or ** indicates significance at 10% or 5% level, respectively. Constants and period dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
(1) Number of observations for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
(2) Correct predictions for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
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Table 7a 
Dynamic Random Effects Panel Model Estimations, with the Basic Regime Classification 
  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2 
LAGINT  7.59** (0.63)  3.18** (55)  7.96** (0.65)  3.44** (0.57)  8.19** (0.81)  3.60** (0.64)  8.63** (1.03)  3.48** (0.90) 
LAGFLEX  4.68** (0.53)  5.93** (0.45)  4.75** (0.59)  5.87** (0.47)  4.96** (0.62)  5.79** (0.46)  4.25** (0.71)  5.30** (0.42) 
OPEN  -0.18 (0.39)  0.15 (0.17)  -0.28 (0.61)  0.20 (0.19)  -0.57 (0.54)  0.23 (0.21)  0.04 (0.36)  0.94** (0.39) 
GCON  0.81 (1.18)  0.73 (0.82)  0.68 (1.47)  1.04 (0.90)  0.65 (3.28)  0.75 (0.97)  -1.07 (2.45)  0.29 (1.65) 
SIZE  0.15 (0.12)  0.34** (0.07)  0.12 (0.14)  0.30** (0.07)  0.14 (0.17)  0.31** (0.08)  -0.12 (0.23)  0.32** (0.12) 
LEVEL  0.40** (0.18)  -0.32** (0.11)  0.36 (0.25)  -0.33** (0.13)  0.46** (0.23)  -0.22 (0.14)  0.81 (0.50)  -0.37 (0.31) 
FINDEV  -1.42* (0.85)  -0.76* (0.40)  -1.53 (1.11)  -0.50 (0.40)  -1.29 (1.22)  -1.19* (0.67)  -3.31 (2.31)  -0.93 (1.21) 
CPINF      2.73** (1.27)  3.07** (0.70)  2.32* (1.36)  2.74** (0.78)  2.15 (1.82)  2.90** (1.12) 
RERVOL      -16.71** (6.74)  -1.81 (1.34)  -13.84** (6.60)  -1.72 (1.36)  -16.85** (8.08)  -1.69 (1.42) 
NOMSHK      -1.63 (3.86)  -2.86 (2.19)  -1.92 (5.40)  -3.63* (2.19)  2.08 (4.25)  -3.66 (2.75) 
RESERVE          1.21 (0.74)  -0.03 (0.20)  0.56 (1.40)  -1.15 (1.09) 
FISCAL          0.49 (13.58)  -0.28 (2.97)  5.10 (6.95)  0.60 (6.30) 
CA          -0.73 (2.31)  -0.60 (1.48)  -3.99 (4.08)  -0.85 (3.08) 
KCONTR              0.08 (0.50)  0.02 (0.40) 
FREEIDX              -0.00 (0.13)  0.23** (0.10) 
POLINST              -0.08 (0.37)  0.19 (0.20) 
￿11  0.03 (0.41)  0.02 (0.30)  0.01 (0.11)  0.05 (0.38) 
￿12  0.03 (0.27)  0.02 (0.23)  -0.01 (0.12)  0.03 (0.13) 











Countries  128  124  118  94 
Obs.
(1)  1259 / 170 / 794 / 2223  1193 / 163 / 769 / 2125  1143 / 158 / 735 / 2036  654 / 87 / 448 / 1189 
% pred.
(2)  96.6 / 80.0 / 90.2 / 93.0  96.8 / 81.0 / 90.8 / 93.4  96.9 / 81.0 / 90.7 / 93.4  96.9 / 85.1 / 87.7 / 92.6 
Notes: * or ** indicates significance at 10% or 5% level, respectively. Constants and period dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
(1) Number of observations for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
(2) Correct predictions for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
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Table 7b 
Dynamic Random Effects Panel Model Estimations, with the Alternative Regime Classification 
  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2  ￿1 and ￿1  ￿2 and ￿2 
LAGINT  7.00** (0.33)  4.01** (0.37)  6.98** (0.35)  4.08** (0.40)  7,00** (0,42)  4,15** (0,44)  6,53** (0,64)  3,14** (0,52) 
LAGFLEX  5.04** (0.44)  7.09** (0.54)  4.96** (0.50)  6.89** (0.52)  4,96** (0,54)  6,87** (0,52)  4,56** (0,69)  6,16** (0,75) 
OPEN  -0.13 (0.25)  -0.14 (0.28)  -0.27  (0.32)  -0.16 (0.46)  -0,47 (0,36)  -0,07 (0,52)  0,84 (0,57)  1,19* (0,68) 
GCON  -1.13 (0.94)  -0.78 (1.07)  -1.30 (1.15)  -0.64 (1.30)  -1,48 (1,10)  -0,97 (1,28)  -3,78** (1,36)  -1,88 (1,43) 
SIZE  0.16** (0.08)  0.23** (0.09)  0.13 (0.08)  0.20** (0.09)  0,13 (0,09)  0,20 (0,13)  0,31** (0,15)  0,10 (0,17) 
LEVEL  0.06 (0.12)  -0.27* (0.14)  0.05 (0.13)  -0.25* (0.15)  0,15 (0,17)  -0,12 (0,24)  0,10 (0,23)  -0,37 (0,27) 
FINDEV  0.12 (0.09)  -0.48 (0.35)  0.08 (0.09)  -0.44 (0.50)  0,09 (0,11)  -1,77** (0,77)  0,13 (0,41)  -2,01 (1,32) 
CPINF      2.71** (0.94)  2.76** (0.84)  2,69** (0,98)  2,32** (0,90)  0,84 (1,23)  2,61** (1,11) 
RERVOL      -12.10** (3.28)  -1.21 (1.05)  -12,00** (3,49)  -1,10 (1,02)  -10,57** (4,31)  -1,43 (1,26) 
NOMSHK      -6.00** (2.53)  -6.34** (2.82)  -6,77** (2,68)  -7,12** (2,95)  -3,56 (2,99)  -6,71* (3,56) 
RESERVE          0,49 (0,57)  -0,13 (0,75)  -0,23 (0,79)  -0,80 (0,85) 
FISCAL          -0,28 (0,97)  -1,66 (1,62)  4,53* (2,62)  1,54 (3,15) 
CA          -0,93 (1,27)  0,18 (1,12)  -3,87* (2,10)  0,78 (2,26) 
KCONTR              0,27* (0,17)  0,08 (0,18) 
FREEIDX              0,13 (0,11)  0,40** (0,12) 
POLINST              0,54** (0,24)  0,22 (0,26) 
￿11  0.06 (0.15)  0.01 (0.12)  0.09 (0.25)  0.53 (0.71) 
￿12  0.02 (0.02)  0.00 (0.07)  0.03 (0.16)  -0.28 (0.45) 











Countries  128  124  118  94 
Obs.
(1)  810 / 1022 / 391 / 2223  752 / 1000 / 373 / 2125  722 / 965 / 349 / 2036  431 / 559 / 199 / 1189 
% pred.
(2)  97.0 / 91.2 / 81.8 / 91.7  97.2 / 91.6 / 81.8 / 91.9  97.1 / 91.5 / 81.7 / 91.8  96.1 / 90.2 / 74.4 / 89.7 
Notes: * or ** indicates significance at 10% or 5% level, respectively. Constants and period dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. 
(1) Number of observations for Fixed / Intermediate / Flexible / All exchange rate regimes. 
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